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In the Social Contract, one of his best-known
books, Rousseau intended to describe the
relations between states – diplomacy, war,
and peace – but he never completed this,
partly because of time constraints but also
because he was dissatisfied with his thoughts
on the subject. While he emphasized the
harmony that existed among citizens on the
principle of the General Will, he believed
that this harmony was impossible to achieve
on the international level. He burned several
versions of his attempts to grapple with this
subject but some of these have survived:
“Fragments on war” and “That the state of
war arises from the social state.” These texts
show Rousseau’s skepticism that peace could
be maintained among states. In order to
understand his skepticism we must examine
the two “international” moments in his life




In 1743, through of the Abbé Alary of the
French Academy and the Chevalier de Mon-
taigu, Rousseau returned to the service of
the French ambassador in Venice, the Count
of Montaigu. Initially a private secretary,
Rousseau became de facto first secretary
because of a quarrel between the new ambas-
sador and the French consul-general in the
City, Le Blond. Rousseau occupied this post
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for less than a year – from September 14,
1743 to July 25, 1744.
Informing and corresponding are central
functions in diplomacy and Rousseau had
all the skills required to excel as secretary
in Italy. In addition to his writing skills, he
knew Latin and Italian. Moreover, the use
of ciphers in encoding and decoding diplo-
matic messages was not an obstacle for a
musician such as Rousseau, who imagined a
new musical notation system. As secretary,
he composed telegrams addressed to the
king, letters to ministers, and submissions
to the authorities of the Venetian Republic.
During this period Rousseau demonstrated
his republican sentiments and his preference
for the people over their rulers (for example,
he refused to ask for money when arranging
passports for French nationals).
During the Renaissance, Venice had
been the laboratory of European diplo-
macy – setting up the first permanent
embassies and formulating a series of rules
to be followed. But the power of the republic
had eroded since that time: by the middle
of the eighteenth century the republic no
longer functioned as the epicenter of Euro-
pean diplomacy, although it did function as
an important diplomatic link in the War of
Austrian Succession. Several princes claimed
the imperial throne after the death of Charles
VI in 1740, as he left no male heir. The
princes called into question the legitimacy
of Charles’s eldest daughter, Maria-Theresa.
The Bourbons, ruling over Spain and Naples,
attempted to take advantage of this situation
and reinforce their power in Italy. The French
branch of the dynasty joined them in 1743
in opposition to the Austrians led by Prince
Lobkhowicz. The French government feared
thatVenicewould break the rules of neutrality
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and take the side of Austria. French diplo-
mats also used Venice as a hub for gathering
wartime intelligence. In these circumstances
Rousseau gained practical experience of crisis
diplomacy when, as he said, “we were at war.”
This “practical moment” influenced him ten
years later when his patron, Madame Dupin,
commissioned him to publicize the ideas of
the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.
Between 1713 and 1728 Saint-Pierre pub-
lished numerous volumes dedicated to the
search for peace among the European pow-
ers. These thousands of pages were difficult
reading and Rousseau had to synthesize
Saint-Pierre’s ideas in order to make them
accessible to a wider audience. Residing in the
woods of Montmorency in 1756 Rousseau’s
“theoretical moment” in the realm of inter-
national political thought began. The result
was two books: the Abstract of the Abbé
de Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace
(published in 1761) and the Judgement on
Perpetual Peace (published posthumously).
Saint-Pierre had called upon the will of
European political leaders as well as an
appreciation of their own interests to establish
international peace through law. He proposed
the creation of a European assembly com-
posed of European sovereigns which would
impose the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Several readers of the Abstract, including
Voltaire, believed that Rousseau agreed
with this design. However, in the Judgement
and other writings on war, the differences
between Rousseau and Saint-Pierre become
very clear. His practical experience in Venice
and his criticisms of Saint-Pierre produced
Rousseau’s idea that diplomacy is an activity
which always takes place in the shadowofwar.
DIPLOMACY EMBEDDED IN A “STATE
OFWAR”
According to Rousseau, states do not fight
among themselves constantly but they do
remain in a constant state of war: their
relations may turn into violent confronta-
tions at any moment. He insisted that there
were twomajor reasons for this phenomenon.
First, states (like people) are affected by their
passions and therefore their conduct is not
guided purely by reason. Second, the theory
of just war and (more generally) international
law is an instrument of domination. These
two arguments allowed him to distance him-
self from Saint-Pierre as well as from Hobbes
and Grotius.
Intended first and foremost to appeal to
the reason of princes, Saint-Pierre’s con-
ception was inspired by the Enlightenment
tradition that expresses confidence in human
progress. Rousseau, however, did not share
this rationalism. As he saw it, political bodies
operate on the basis of the passions, especially
negative passions such as love of self (pride
or vanity) but also ostentation (an excessive
display to attract admiration and envy). In
contrast to the natural body, political bodies
are undetermined and related: their scope or
geographical shape depends on their environ-
ment and relationships with their peers.There
is no natural criterion for setting themup, and
their form thus results from “comparison” and
“friction” with other bodies: “the size of the
body politic being purely relative, it is forced
to compare itself in order to know itself; it
depends on its whole environment and has to
take an interest in all that happens. In vain, it
wishes to stay within its own bounds, neither
gaining nor losing; it becomes big or small,
strong or weak according to the extent that
its neighbour expands or contracts, grows
stronger or weaker” (Rousseau 2008: 77). In
other words, states are in a perpetual state of
war with each other because of their artificial
nature. This view is far from Hobbes’s belief
that war is “natural” because, for Rousseau,
“war is a relation not between man and man
but between state and state, and individuals
are enemies only accidentally, not as men
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nor even as citizens but as soldiers” (Social
Contract, book I, ch. 4).
The just-war tradition cannot overcome
this phenomenon according to Rousseau.
Grotius’s unforgivable mistake (and that of
other just-war theorists) lies not only in a gap
between theory and practice, between what
it should be and what it is; his error is also
not limited to an oversight on the status of
the law of war, which remains weak because
of its non-coercive dimension (there is no
global institution that punishes offences).
It results from the statute of law itself: law
was becoming a resource in the hands of the
most powerful states. In interactions between
political bodies, the recognition of justice is
conditioned by the logic of self-interest.
To mitigate the effects of this state of war,
Rousseau proposed confederations of small
republics. He believed that the model he
proposed would combine the qualities of
two different political regimes: monarchies
and democracies. Like monarchical states,
a confederation of republics would be able
to mobilize strong armed forces in defense
against the expansionist aims of imperialist
powers; like democracies, they would be able
to preserve the virtue of citizen participation
at the domestic level. The confederation
would shape a foreign policy based on strate-
gic restraint and the primacy of a defensive
policy. Rousseau uses the Helvetic example
in the Projet de constitution pour la Corse and
the Considérations sur le gouvernement de
Pologne. To a certain extent, he comes back
to the autarky promoted by the ancients. In
such a polity, diplomacy focuses on territorial
protection and not the development of new
alliances with foreign states or a project of
conquest. The main purpose is to establish
a less threatening political body in interna-
tional affairs while ensuring its preservation
over time. It should be emphasized that the
defense of the confederation does not entail
the end of war. These confederations do not
“end the madness, they simply provide small
States a means to be wise among fools” (Hoff-
mann 1963). Therefore, neither a realist nor
a hopeless idealist, Rousseau offers a singular
approach to international relations theory:
he demonstrated how both oppression and
war could be avoided, the two most negative
consequences arising from the creation of the
modern state.
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